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Abstract
Micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) have strategic roles in economic structure, especially 
in developing countries, so, they need supports from the banking industry, including foreign banks, 
by giving loans they need. This study aims to find the effect of bank ownership and mode of entry 
on credit allocation to MSMEs. We use 110 samples of conventional commercial banks and 41 
samples of foreign-owned banks in Indonesia during 2010-2017, with 686 and 266 observations. 
The results of multiple regression show that banks with government ownership have higher credit 
allocation to MSMEs than non-government ownership and banks with foreign ownership have 
lower credit allocation to MSMEs than domestic ownership. Based on their mode of entry, banks 
with foreign ownership via greenfield have lower credit allocation to MSMEs than via takeover. 
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INTRODUCTION
The development of micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) is vital for national economic growth. 
MSMEs are the main sources of employment for the nation and contribute significantly to a country's economy 
(Eze et al., 2021). Several studies showed that MSMEs have strategic roles in economic structure, especially 
in developing countries, such as Indonesia. MSMEs usually face many financial constraints (as opposed to 
large companies which usually have more opportunities to obtain external financing), this is because creditors 
face difficulties in accessing information about MSMEs (Cariola et al., 2020). To overcome this problem, the 
government through Bank Indonesia Regulation (PBI) No. 17/12/PBI/2015 requires banks, including foreign 
banks, to increase their credit allocation to MSMEs, namely 5% in 2015, 10% in 2016, 15% in 2017, and 20% 
in 2018. From this regulation, we can find out how important MSMEs are in Indonesia. Bank’s credit allocation 
to MSMEs in Indonesia grows every year and the growth is higher than total credit in the banking industry in 
general. Figure 1 shows that MSMEs credit growth in Indonesia increases from 2012 until 2017 and the growth 
in 2017 is the highest.








Source: Data of MSMEs Credit, Dec 2017 (Indonesian Central Bank)
Figure 1. MSMEs Credit Growth
The existence of foreign banks and ownership has been debatable, considering its advantages and disadvantages 
(Lubis, et al., 2015). Foreign investors in Indonesia are allowed to own bank shares up to 99% based on 
Government Regulations No 29 in 1999. This high foreign participation hopefully could increase total credit 
allocation to MSMEs in the banking industry and give an advantage to economies in the country, however, 
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there are a few studies that showed that foreign banks tend to allocate credits to transparent borrowers only and 
ignore opaque borrowers, like MSMEs.
The type of bank ownership is one of the main factors influencing credit allocation decisions made by 
banks. The main reason behind the importance of the role of ownership type is that the type of ownership will 
determine the main motivation in the way a bank to manage their business (Çolak & Şenol, 2021). This is also 
supported by the Banking Industry Profile Report Quarter IV 2017 also showed that based on bank ownership, 
credit allocation to MSMEs is mostly given by state-owned banks (56.08%), private domestic banks (35.13%), 
regional development banks (7.97%), and then followed by foreign-owned banks and joint-venture banks 
(0.82%). Figure 2 shows that banks with government ownership have the highest MSMEs credit growth and 
banks with foreign ownership have the lowest MSMEs credit growth.





0.030 0.028 0.039 0.032 0.031
0.017
Source: Data of MSMEs Credit, Dec 2017 (Indonesian Central Bank)





0.195 0.192 0.181 0.182
0.215
0.242 0.240 0.236 0.242 0.243
Banks can be grouped into many types. In this study, we use 3 groups of banks based on their ownership, 
which are banks with government ownership, private domestic ownership, and foreign ownership. However, based 
on Guidance Book for Central Government Content (2013:32), there are 5 types of conventional commercial 
banks in Indonesia, such as state-owned banks, foreign exchange commercial banks, non-foreign exchange 
commercial banks, regional development banks, joint venture banks, and foreign-owned banks. 
State-owned banks are banks that all or most of the shares are owned by the government, so they are included 
in the group of banks with government ownership. Foreign exchange and non-foreign exchange commercial 
banks are banks that all or most of the shares are owned by private domestic investors, so they are included in 
the group of banks with private domestic ownership. Regional development banks are banks with all or most of 
the shares are owned by the regional government, so they are included in the group of banks with government 
ownership. Joint venture banks are banks that shares are owned by private domestic and foreign investors, so 
they are included in the group of foreign ownership if there are more than 50% of the shares owned by foreign 
investors. Foreign-owned banks are banks that all of the shares are owned by foreign investors, so they are 
included in the group of banks with foreign ownership.
Foreign ownership itself can be differentiated by their mode of entry or how foreign investors enter domestic 
banking markets, which are greenfield and takeover. Banks with foreign ownership via greenfield are banks that 
enter domestic banking markets by doing greenfield investing or directly open new branch offices or subsidiaries 
in the host country with shares more than 50%. While banks with foreign ownership via takeover are banks that 
enter domestic banking markets by doing a takeover process on domestic banks with shares more than 50% 
(DeGryse et al., 2012).
One of the main activities of the banking industry is to allocate credits to borrowers. This credit allocation 
can be viewed by their type of borrowers and borrower transparency. Based on this, credit allocation to Micro, 
Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) is interesting to be tested, because we could see the role of information 
for banks in the decision of this credit allocation. Credit allocation to MSMEs is credit allocated by banks to 
the borrowers that are opaque (not transparent) because their accounting information is so little and it is hard 
for banks to evaluate them. Banks could only evaluate them based on soft information, such as their business, 
owner, and management information (Dell’ Ariccia and Marquez, 2004). 
Banks with government ownership have higher credit allocation to MSMEs than non-government ownership 
because these banks are influenced by the government’s consideration to provide subsidized loans (DeGryse et al., 
2012). They have another objective besides maximizing profits, namely social objectives (Berger et al., 2004), so 
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MSMEs could obtain adequate financing to expand their businesses. They also have better access to MSMEs, so 
they allocate more credits to MSMEs than banks with non-government ownership (Berger et al., 2001). 
Banks with foreign ownership have lower credit allocation to MSMEs than domestic ownership, because 
these banks have to face information weaknesses and therefore, they prefer to target clients that are more 
transparent and have lower credit allocation to MSMEs than banks with domestic ownership because they 
have high asymmetry information (Dell’ Aricia and Marquez, 2004; Sengupta, 2007; Detragiache et al., 2008; 
Althammer and Haselmann, 2011; Gormley, 2014). If these banks could get soft information, they might have 
difficulties or are less willing to communicate it to the parent bank (DeGryse et al., 2012). These banks also have 
a screening advantage. Their screening technology is better than domestic banks to evaluate their borrowers and 
therefore they tend to ignore borrowers that have high asymmetry information like MSMEs (Boustanifar, 2014). 
Banks with foreign ownership via greenfield have lower credit allocation to MSMEs than via takeover 
because these banks are facing larger information disadvantage, so they will only rely on hard information 
to analyze their borrowers’ creditworthy, while banks with foreign ownership via takeover have incumbency 
advantage, which makes them have the customer base and could use soft information in addition to financial 
reports, and therefore these banks will still maintain riskier borrowers from the previous domestic banks (Claeys 
and Heinz, 2014).
Most of previous studies that addressed many issues of bank ownership structure only focused on the effect 
of bank ownership structure on risk and performance (Ding et al., 2020; Luu et al., 2020), while studies about 
bank ownership and mode of entry on bank credit allocation to MSMEs are still limited, especially in Indonesia. 
Therefore, this study is intended to fill in the research gap by providing an analysis of the relationship between 
bank ownership, mode of entry, and credit allocation to MSMEs. This research is also the first research that 
discusses the allocation of bank credit to MSMEs in a comprehensive manner. The objective of this study was 
to use bank-level information to determine if banks with government ownership have higher credit allocation to 
MSMEs than non-government ownership and foreign ownership have lower credit allocation to MSMEs than 
banks with domestic ownership and if banks with foreign ownership via greenfield have lower credit allocation 
to MSMEs than via takeover.
METHODS 
To examine the impact of bank ownership and mode of entry on credit allocation to MSMEs, the author 
estimates the following model:
Credit_MSMEsi,t = α + β1 Governmenti,t-1 + β2 Foreigni,t-1 + β3 Capitalizationi,t-1 + β4 Credit_Riski,t-1 + β5 Inflationt-1 
+ εi,t  ...(1)
Credit_MSMEsi,t = α+ β1 MOEi,t-1 + β2 Capitalizationi,t-1 + β3 Credit_Riski,t-1 + β4 Inflationt-1 + εi,t ..................(2)
where:
α = Intercept from regression models 
β = Coefficient from each variable on the regression models
Credit_MSMEsi,t = Credit allocation to MSMEs of bank i at time t 
Governmenti,t-1 = Dummy variable for government ownership of bank i at time t-1, which takes the value 
of 1 if more than 50% of the bank is owned by government and 0 if more than 50% of the 
bank is owned by non-government. 
Foreigni,t-1 = Dummy variable for foreign ownership of bank i at time t-1, which takes the value of 1 if 
more than 50% of the bank is owned by foreign investors and 0 if more than 50% of the 
bank is owned by domestic investors. 
MOEi,t-1 = Mode of Entry is dummy variable for banks with foreign ownership based on their mode 
of entry of bank i at time t-1, which takes the value of 1 if foreign investor enter the market 
via greenfield with more than 50% of the bank shares and 0 if foreign investor enter the 
market via takeover with more than 50% of the bank shares.
Capitalizationi,t-1 = Capitalization of bank i at time t-1 as a control variable (Measured by Capital Adequacy 
Ratio)
Credit_Riski,t-1 = Credit risk of bank i at time t-1 as a control variable (Measured by the ratio of Non-
Performing Loans to total loans)
Inflationt-1 = Inflation rate at time t-1 as a control variable
ɛi,t = Error term of bank i at time t
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In order to estimate the multiple regression model, the author used 110 samples of conventional commercial 
banks (for model 1) and 41 samples of foreign-owned banks (for model 2) in Indonesia during 2010-2017, with 
686 observations for model 1 and 266 observations for model 2. The data are from Financial Services Authority 
and Indonesian Central Bank database, and also directly from the respective bank’s annual financial report.
RESULTS
Table 1 reports that on average, all banks allocated 27.3 percent of their credit to MSMEs and all foreign 
banks allocated 12.3 percent of their credit to MSMEs. In addition, 18 percent of the banking industry is owned 
by the government, and 39 percent of the banking industry is owned by foreign investors and based on their 
mode of entry, 49 percent of all foreign banks entering banking markets via greenfield.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
N Mean Std. Dev Min. Max.
Credit_MSMEs
Model 1 686 0.273 0.252 0.000 0.995
Model 2 266 0.123 0.148 0.000 0.798
Government 686 0.180 0.381 0.000 1.000
Foreign 686 0.390 0.488 0.000 1.000
MOE 266 0.490 0.501 0.000 1.000
Capitalization
Model 1 686 0.255 0.193 0.000 1.814
Model 2 266 0.307 0.250 0.000 1.814
Credit_Risk
Model 1 686 0.024 0.028 0.000 0.376
Model 2 266 0.024 0.030 0.000 0.339
Inflation
Model 1 686 0.051 0.022 0.028 0.084
Model 2 266 0.051 0.022 0.028 0.084
Moreover, we show the results of the Pearson correlation in this study. Pearson correlation is a correlation 
measure used to measure the strength and direction of a linear relationship between two variables. Table 2 
shows that the government ownership has a significant positive correlation with credit allocation to MSMEs 
at a significance level of 1%. Foreign ownership has a significant negative correlation with credit allocation to 
MSMEs at a significance level of 1%. Credit risk has a significant negative correlation with credit allocation to 
MSMEs with a significance level of 10%. Capitalization and inflation have no significant negative correlation 
with credit allocation to MSMEs. Meanwhile, Table 3 shows that the mode of entry has a significant negative 
correlation with credit allocation to MSMEs at a significance level of 1%. Capitalization, credit risk and inflation 
has no significant positive correlation with credit allocation to MSMEs.
Table 2. Pearson Correlation (Model 1)




Foreign -0.472*** -0.369*** 1.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Capitalization -0.031 -0.175*** 0.219*** 1.000
(0.212) (0.000) (0.000)
Credit Risk -0.056* 0.105*** 0.003 0.002 1.000
(0.071) (0.003) (0.468) (0.474)
Inflation -0.022 -0.006 -0.009 -0.058* -0.141*** 1.000
(0.286) (0.443) (0.412) (0.066) (0.000)
Sign ***, **, and * present significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Numbers in parenthesis is p-value
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The results of the regression analysis based on Table 4 column 1 show that the dummy variable Governmenti,t-1 
have a significant positive effect on Credit_MSMEsi,t, while Foreigni,t-1 have a significant negative effect on 
Credit_MSMEsi,t. And when we also inputted our control variables (capitalization, credit risk, and inflation), 
the results in column 2 remain the same. It shows that banks with government ownership have higher credit 
allocation to MSMEs than non-government ownership and foreign ownership has lower credit allocation to 
MSMEs than domestic ownership.
Moreover, Table 5 column 1 shows that the dummy variable MOEi,t-1 has a significant negative effect on 
Credit_MSMEsi,t and with controlling capitalization, credit risk, and inflation, Table 2 column 2 also shows the 
consistent results. It shows that based on their mode of entry, banks with foreign ownership via greenfield have 
lower credit allocation to MSMEs than via takeover. The results for control variables based on Tables 4 and 5 
are as follows. Capitalizationi,t-1 have a significant positive effect on Credit_MSMEsi,t, while Credit_Riski,t-1 have 
a significant negative effect on Credit_MSMEsi,t. It shows that when banks have higher capitalization, credit 
allocation to MSMEs increases, and when banks have higher credit risk, credit allocation to MSMEs decreases. 
Inflationt-1 has no significant effect on Credit_MSMEsi,t.
Table 3. Pearson Correlation (Model 2)




Capitalization 0.063 0.093* 1.000
(0.154) (0.065)
Credit Risk -0.057 -0.071 0.120** 1.000
(0.178) (0.123) (0.026)
Inflation -0.014 0.012 -0.067 -0.199*** 1.000
(0.408) (0.420) (0.138) (0.001)
Sign ***, **, and * present significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Numbers in parenthesis is p-value.
Table 4. Regressions of Credit MSMEs on Government and 
Foreign Ownership

















Sign ***, **, and * present significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Numbers in parenthesis is p-value
Table 5. Regressions of Credit MSMEs on Mode of Entry 
(MOE)















Sign ***, **, and * present significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level.
Numbers in parenthesis is p-value
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DISCUSSIONS
The results above indicate that banks with government ownership have higher credit allocation to MSMEs 
than non-government ownership. This is because these banks have social objectives other than maximizing their 
profits. The government will influence them to allocate more loans to MSMEs to give these entities adequate 
financing to expand their businesses and eventually will support the economies in the country. These banks also 
have better access to MSMEs, so they have the ability to give them more loans. This result is consistent with 
Berger et al. (2001, 2004) and Lubis, et al. (2015) who suggested a significant positive effect of government 
ownership on credit allocation to MSMEs.
Moreover, banks with foreign ownership have lower credit allocation to MSMEs than domestic ownership. 
This is because these banks have a screening advantage to evaluate borrowers that are not creditworthy, such 
as MSMEs who have high asymmetry information. These banks are also known for their high efficiency, so 
they will allocate their credit to transparent borrowers only because they are less risky and easy to evaluate 
based on the hard information they have and therefore this type of borrowers is not as costly as MSMEs. This 
result is consistent with Berger et al. (2001), Clarke et al. (2005, 2006), Mian (2006), Giannetti and Ongena 
(2009, 2012), and Gormley (2010) who suggested a significant negative effect of foreign ownership on credit 
allocation to MSMEs.
In addition, banks with foreign ownership via greenfield have lower credit allocation to MSMEs than via 
takeover, because to analyze and monitor borrowers like MSMEs, banks need to use soft information, which 
could not be done by banks with foreign ownership via greenfield. Banks with foreign ownership via takeover 
have more advantages than greenfield because they got a customer base when they did a takeover on domestic 
banks. This customer base makes banks still have to fulfill credit demand from the old MSMEs customer, and 
they have the ability to do so because they could access both information, either soft or hard information. This 
result is consistent with DeGryse et al. (2012) and Claeys and Heinz (2014) who suggested a significant negative 
effect of mode of entry (greenfield) on credit allocation to MSMEs.
The results also show the effect of control variables, such as capitalization, credit risk, and inflation, on 
credit allocation to MSMEs. Capitalization has a significant positive effect on credit allocation to MSMEs. 
This is because banks with higher capitalization have enough capital to expand their credit to MSMEs, which 
take time and effort to evaluate them. These banks are willing to take more risks on this type of borrower 
because they have adequate buffers to cover this risk. Credit risk has a significant negative effect on credit 
allocation to MSMEs. This is because banks with higher credit risk are not healthy. They often suffer from 
financial distress and therefore will be required by government supervisors, depositors, and capital market 
investors to reduce their risk profile. Banks will reduce their credit allocation to MSMEs because this type 
of borrowers has high asymmetry information, so banks didn’t want to take more risks by giving loans to 
borrowers that are hard to evaluate which could increase their non-performing loans (DeGryse et al., 2012). 
And for the macroeconomic variable, the author used the inflation rate. The results show that inflation has 
no significant effect on credit allocation to MSMEs. This is because even though higher inflation means a 
bad condition of the macroeconomic environment and might make banks less willing to allocate their credit 
to MSMEs (DeGryse et al. 2012), the decisions to allocate credit will still rely on the financial health of the 
bank itself. As long as banks are healthy, like adequate capital and low credit risk, banks will not significantly 
reduce their credit allocation to MSMEs.
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Using a dataset from Indonesia, the author investigates the effect of bank ownership on credit allocation to 
MSMEs, controlling for capitalization, credit risk, and inflation rate. The main results can be summarized as 
follows. First, banks with government ownership have higher credit allocation to MSMEs than non-government 
ownership. This is consistent with the theory suggesting that these banks have the government’s considerations 
to give subsidized loans to entities like MSMEs. Second, banks with foreign ownership have lower credit 
allocation to MSMEs than domestic ownership. This is consistent with the theory suggesting that these banks 
face disadvantages to collect soft information which is used to evaluate borrowers like MSMEs, so they prefer 
to allocate their credit to transparent borrowers. And based on the mode of entry, banks with foreign ownership 
via greenfield have lower credit allocation to MSMEs than via takeover. This is consistent with the theory 
suggesting that banks with foreign ownership via takeover have an incumbency advantage, which makes them 
get the ability to use soft information and allocate their credit to MSMEs from the old customers. 
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